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NEPA: FULL OF SOUND AND FURY .. .?
The efforts of our citizens and the Congress to save our parklands
and to preserve our environment deserve a more hospitable reception
and more faithful observance than they have apparently found either
in the Executive branch, or thus far, in the courts.'
Man has been, is, and will continue to be dependent upon the environ-
ment for the essential and non-essential components of his existence. In
twentieth century America, the inevitable realization that environmental
resources are not infinite has fostered an increased interest in stemming
the tide of ecological devastation now being carried out in the name of
progress and technological convenience.
Man's large scale efforts to actively conserve his resources, and to pre-
serve his natural legacy for future generations, were a significant product
of the sixties. At the state level, laws peculiarly directed toward environ-
mental problems were enacted.2 But more importantly, it became ap-
parent that the ramifications of the ecological threat were national in
scope, and consequently an appropriate subject of federal as well as state
legislation. Congress has responded to this recognized need for national
environmental legislation in several particular areas.8
Owing principally to the scope of activities which have become the
province of federal agency activity in recent years, it may now be fairly
said that the United States Government itself has become a significant
factor in the erosion of environmental systems. Conversely, given the
1 Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 971-72 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion to denial of certiorari).
2 For a comprehensive breakdown of state air and water legislation to date, see BNA
ENIqRONMENT RPTR.-STATE AIR LAWS & STATE WATER LAWS.
3 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970);
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662 (1970); River and Harbor Act,
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964). See also Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3251-3259 (Supp. V, 1965); Water Resources Research Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
5§ 1961a-4, 1961b, 1961c-7 (Supp. V, 1965); Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 79
Stat. 244 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Federal Aviation Act of 1958,




proper incentives, it could become a most influential proselyte in the
effort to preserve the environment for present and future generations.
Assessed voter desire for limitations on environmental destruction by the
agencies of the Federal Government led to congressional enactment of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) . Although
its ultimate success or failure in contributing to the conservation and
preservation of the environment must await later analysis, early adminis-
trative and judicial experience with NEPA allows tentative conclusions
as to the validity of its purposes and the success of its methods in accom-
plishing them.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
NEPA declares that the continuing policy of the Federal Government,
in cooperation with state and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, is to use all practicable means, includ-
ing financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to create
and maintain "conditions under which man and nature can exist in pro-
ductive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other require-
ments of present and future generations of Americans." 5 To that end,
the Act imposes on the federal agencies the continuing responsibility
"to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs and resources." 8 The Act represents a congressional
compromise, combining features of bills introduced separately in the
Senate and the House of Representatives during the 1969 session.7
Much of the National Environmental Policy Act speaks in laudable
generalities of the necessity for and desirability of policy-level environ-
mental controls, without actually requiring limitations on ecologically
detrimental activities." In contrast, the most far-reaching implications
of the legislation arise from that portion, originating in the Senate, which
442 U.S.C §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. V, 1965). On the need for the legislation, see U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751-58 (1969). NEPA went into effect on January 1, 1970.
5 42 US.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1965).
61d. § 4331(b).
7 EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). For a full
treatment of the legislative history of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
see U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751 (1969).
sSee 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-31 (Supp. V, 1965).
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requires federal agencies to consider the ecological effects of certain of
their actions by following a set of procedural requisites: 9
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall ... include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the respon-
sible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.10
NEPA thus makes it clear that each agency of the Federal Govern-
ment must comply with its procedural provisions unless the existing law
applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits that compliance,
or makes full compliance impossible." However, if compliance is im-
possible as to one particular facet of an agency's actions, it may still be
required in other activities of the agency.12 Furthermore, the policies and
goals set forth in the Act should be regarded as supplementary to those
set forth in existing authorizations of federal agencies. They do not af-
fect the specific statutory obligations of an agency to comply with exist-
ing criteria or standards of environmental quality, to coordinate or con-
sult with any other federal or state agency, or to act or refrain from act-
ing contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other
federal or state agency.' 3 NEPA's procedural requirements are better
viewed as mandatory: 14
9 Id. § 4332.
10Old. § 43 32 (2) (c).
11 See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2767, 2769-70 (1969).
12 Id. at 2770.
13 42 U.S.C. § 4334.
14See Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 969 (1970)
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.. it is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest
extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of
avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102. Rather,
the language in section 102 is intended to assure that all agencies of the
Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in said
section "to the fullest extent possible" under their statutory authoriza-
tions and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construc-
tion of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.15
Subsequent to the congressional enactment of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, President Nixon, by executive order, rearticulated
that the heads of the several federal agencies are under a continuing ob-
ligation to "monitor, evaluate, and control their agencies' activities so as
to protect and enhance the quality of the environment." ' Furthermore,
they must develop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision
of timely public information and understanding of federal plans and pro-
grams with environmental impact, in order to obtain the views of in-
terested parties in the decision-making process.'7
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcT STATEMENTS
The various federal agencies must comply with the procedural re-
quirements of the Environmental Policy Act by filing an Environmental
Impact Statement"' with the Council on Environmental Quality, which
was created by the Act.' 9 The Council has issued guidelines for the agen-
cies to follow in compliance with the mandate of the Act.20 These guide-
(dissenting opinion to denial of certiorari) wherein Mr. Justice Black uses mandatory
language: the Act "requires a detailed study of the probable effects before approval of
'major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment:""
(emphasis added); Texas" Comm. v. United States, 1 ERC 1303, 1304, vacated as moot,
430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970) wherein the court stated, "[iut is hard to imagine a
clearer or stronger miandate to the courts." (emphasis added). But see Ely v. Velde, 321
F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971) indicating that compliance with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 is discretionary.
15 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADin. NEws 2767, 2770 (1969).
16Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 2(a), 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).
17 Id. 5 2(b).
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (Supp. V, 1965).
19 Id. §§ 4341-47.
(.$ see BNA ENVIMRONMENT RPTR.-FEDERAL LAws 71:0301 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL GUIDELINES]. These guidelines for federal agencies under NEPA, though not
carrying the weight accorded legislation or decisional law, nevertheless have persuasive
value in establishing the standards to which the agencies must adhere: "When faced
19711 NEPA
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lines establish that, as a matter of policy, before undertaking a major ac-
tion, an agency must assess the potential long- and short-term environ-
mental impact "in order that adverse effects are avoided, and environ-
mental quality is restored or enhanced, to the fullest extent practi-
cable." 21 In particular, alternative actions that will minimize adverse
impact should be explored.22 Agency heads must set up methods for
identifying actions which require Environmental Impact Statements, ob-
taining information required in their preparation, designating which in-
dividuals are to be responsible for the statements, consulting with and
taking account of the comments of appropriate federal, state and local
agencies, and providing the required timely public information on fed-
eral plans and programs having environmental impact. They must file
information on these procedures with the Council on Environmental
Quality."
NEPA requires an Environmental Impact Statement whenever an
agency makes recommendations or reports on proposals for legislation
and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.24 Such actions include, but are not limited to:
(i) recommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropria-
tions;
(ii) projects and continuing activities
-directly undertaken by Federal agencies
-supported in whole or in part through Federal contracts, grants,
subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance
with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the in-
terpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.
To sustain the commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that
its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have
reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." Unemploy-
ment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946). See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 (1965); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Universal Battery Co. v. United States,
281 U.S. 580 (1930). In Udall, supra, the Court stated:
Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake involves
a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the man charged with the respon-
sibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently
while they are yet untried and new. 380 U.S. at 16.
See generally Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971).
21 FEDERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 20.
22 Id. 2.
23.1d. 3 (a).
2442 U.S.C. S 4332 (2) (c) (Supp. V, 1965).
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-involving a Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other en-
tidement for use;
(iii) policy-and procedure-making.25
The statutory clause, "major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment," is to be construed by the agen-
cies with a view to the overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed,
and of further actions contemplated. Such actions may be localized in
their impact, but if there is potential that the environment may be sig-
nificantly affected, the statement must be prepared. Proposed actions,
the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly controversial,
should be covered in all cases. In considering what constitutes major
action significantly affecting the environment, it should be borne in mind
that the effect of many federal decisions concerning a project or a com-
plex of projects can be individually limited, but cumulatively consider-
able. The agency should prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the
environment from the federal action.2 6
The Council on Environmental Quality has taken the position that an
Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared for further "major
Federal actions" even though the environmental impact arises in part
from projects or programs initiated before January 1, 1970, the effective
date of the Act. Even when it is not practical to reassess the basic course
of action, it is still important that further increments of federal action
be so shaped as to minimize adverse environmental consequences. It is
also important, in further action, that account be taken of environmental
consequences not fully evaluated at the outset of the project or pro-
gram.2 7
The Council on Environmental Quality has established six guidelines
to be used by the agencies in preparing Environmental Impact State-
ments. A Statement should include (1) a discussion of the probable im-
pact of the proposed action on the environment-including primary and
secondary consequences, 28 (2) any unavoidable adverse effects,2 9 (3) a
rigorous analysis of alternatives to the proposed action,30 (4) an assess-
25 FEDRAL GUmELINES, supra note 20, 5 (a).
26Id. 5 (b).
27Id. ii.
28 Id. 7(a) (i).
29 Id. 7(a) (ii).
30 Id. 7 (a) (iii).
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ment of the action from the standpoint of cumulative and long-term ef-
fects on succeeding generations,31 (5) an identification of any irreversi-
ble and irretrievable commitments of resources,32 and (6) a discussion
of problems and objections raised by other federal, state and local en-
tities in the review process and in the disposition of the issues involved.3
Implicit in the requirement that an Environmental Impact Statement
be prepared is the requirement of the National Environmental Policy
Act that the information contained therein must be utilized in the
agency's determination of the overall feasibility of a project. To this
end, the federal agencies are obliged to identify at what stage or stages
in their actions on a particular matter the procedures will be applied. It
will often be necessary to use the procedures in the development of a
national program and in the review of proposed individual projects with-
in the national program. 4
Pursuant to statutory requirements, numerous agencies have estab-
lished procedural guidelines they intend to follow, and have filed them
with the Council on Environmental Quality. Furthermore, a number of
Environmental Impact Statements relating to specific federal actions have
been filed with the Council.
The Council on Environmental Quality, however, has refused to make
public its criticisms of those Statements it receives, claiming executive
privilege. Furthermore, it has no power to require the filing of adequate
Statements by withholding funds until an agency complies. As a con-
sequence, the potential intra-governmental effectiveness of NEPA is
seriously impaired. Persons aggrieved by agency action are needlessly
deprived of potential concurring evidence by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality. More seriously, non-compliant, environmentally detri-
mental projects may be begun before aggrieved individuals may secure
access to the courts to gain relief. On the administrative level, NEPA
provides simply no machinery to enforce compliance with its policies,
or to prohibit arbitrary, violative agency practices which may result in
detriment to the environment. Consequently, it is hoped that Congress
will amend the Act, perhaps by giving the Council on Environmental
3 lId. $ 7 (a) (iv).
3 2 Id. 7 (a) (v).
33 Id. T 7 (a) (vi). State and local review of the environmental action is also provided.
For a detailed discussion of procedure, see GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVmRoN-
MENTAL LAW 1038-67 (1970).
34 Id. 10 (a).
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Quality the authority to require the filing of Environmental Impact
Statements.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
In the courts, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is
emerging primarily as a private vehicle for limiting federal and federal-
state actions which arbitrarily affect the beauty and utility of parks, his-
torical areas, wildlife preserves, and like public interest property. How-
ever, there is no limitation against its use in other types of environmental
cases. Injunctions are granted for violation of the Act. Yet, no cases
have been found where damages have been sought for its breach. NEPA's
ramifications are not limited to actions causing environmental impact in
the United States.t It is before the courts that an aggrieved party stands
his best chance of relief in environmental actions under NEPA:
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a
flood of new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protect-
ing our natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest
to the commitment of the Government to control, at long last, the de-
structive engine of material "progress." But it remains to be seen
whether the promise of this legislation will become a reality. Therein
lies the judicial role. 8
A. Standing to Sue
In the federal judiciary, environmental conservation groups as well as
private individuals have been allowed to invoke the aid of NEPA as a
result of recent Supreme Court decisions eroding the requirements of
standing to sue.3 7 Thus, even in those cases where the courts have not
granted relief to the complainants, they have recognized the complain-
ants' standing, as private citizens and organizations, to enforce the man-
datory requirements of the Act.38
35See State Comm. v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wisc. 1970).
36 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, - F.2d -- , I ELR 20346 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
37See EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); EDF v. Corps
of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D.
Va. 1971); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970); Pennsylvania
Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
38 Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971) (holding NEPA discretionary).
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Under NEPA, standing to sue involves a two-pronged test: (1)
whether the plaintiff has alleged an act which has caused him injury, in
fact, economic or otherwise, and (2) whether the interest asserted by
the plaintiff is arguably within the zone of interests sought to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion. The first requirement was held to be satisfied by pleading that
unless an act is enjoined, injury-though not economic-will occur to the
plaintiffs and sufficiently damage their interests as citizens, sportsmen,
and environmentalists. As to whether the plaintiff's interest is within a
zone of protected interests:
... [I]f the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with
the protection of natural, historic and scenic resources, then a congres-
sional intent exists to give standing to groups interested in these factors
and who allege that these factors are not being properly considered by
the agency.40
Furthermore, under NEPA, private plaintiffs are regularly held to be
persons "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute," and they are accorded access to the court under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.41
B. Substantive Rights
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 creates procedural
requirements which are enforceable in the courts through injunctive and
declaratory procedures. Thus, it is held that whenever a "major federal
action" is contemplated, the acting agency must file a detailed Environ-
mental Impact Statement containing, at a minimum, "such information
• . . as will alert the President, the Council on Environmental Quality,
the public and ... congress, to all known, possible environmental con-
sequences of a proposed agency action." 42 Even if the agency finds no
39 See Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971); Pennsylvania Environmental
Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
4oPennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, (M.D. Pa. 1970).
In Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), plaintiffs established standing by
asserting not only injury to their personal interest, but, acting as private attorneys
general, injury to the public interest.
41 See cases cited note 40, supra.
42EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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merit in the potential consequences whatsoever, "the record should be
complete." 0
Furthermore, the adequacy of a filed Environmental Impact Statement
is subject to judicial review. The filing of an adequate statement has been
held to presuppose "a detailed study and examination of the important
environmental factors" 4 which will influence the agency when it de-
cides whether to undertake an action involving environmental conse-
quences. "The Congress of the United States is intent upon requiring
the agencies of the United States Government ... to objectively evalu-
ate all of their projects, regardless of how much money has already been
spent thereon, and regardless of the degree of completion of the work." 4;
The procedural requisites of NEPA are, in the better view, regarded
as mandatory, although they have been classified as discretionary.4 In
addition, while not retroactive,47 they have been held to apply to con-
tinuing federal actions, as well as those originating before January 1,
1970.48 While the environmental analysis approach employed by an
agency may vary according to whether the action contemplated is a
new or an ongoing project, the outcome should be essentially the same
in both cases. 9
The courts have evidenced a reluctance to review an administrative
decision on an environmental matter once the procedural requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act are met. However, an arbi-
trary abuse of administrative decisional power, though procedurally per-
fect, is subject to reversal.50 The burden of proving such an arbitrary
exercise is on the plaintiff.
In early actions under NEPA, plaintiff's counsel have urged that the
Act, and the ninth amendment create in the plaintiffs a substantive right
to "safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings" 51 and to "'an environment which supports diversity
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1262.
45 Id. at 1262.
46 See note 16, supra.
47 See Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Investment Syndicates v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970); Brooks
v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
48 Id.
49EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
6OSee Citizens v.-Volpe, 432 F. 2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970).
51 EDF v. Corps of Engineers,'325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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and variety of individual choice' and 'the widest range of beneficial
values'." 52 However, the courts have adopted a narrow interpretation
of the Environmental Policy Act:
... [I]t is highly doubtful that the Environmental Policy Act can
serve as the basis for a cause of action. Aside from establishing the
council, the Act is simply a declaration of congressional policy; as such,
it would seem not to create any rights or impose any duties of which a
court can take cognizance. There is only the general command to fed-
eral officials to use all practicable means to enhance the environment....
It is unlikely that such a generality could serve or was intended to serve
as a source of court-enforceable dutiesY3
Furthermore, it has been recognized that the Act reflects a compromise
which falls short of creating such substantive rights, and that they do
not now exist under the Constitution. "Apparently, the sponsors could
obtain agreement only upon an act which declared the national environ-
mental policy. While this represents a giant step, it is, nevertheless, only
a step. It does not purport to vest in anyone a right to a particular type
of environment." 54
C. Preliminary Injunction
Alleged violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
is grounds for granting a temporary injunction. Prerequisites include a
showing of irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and a reasonable chance
of success on the merits.55 The process has been viewed as a traditional
"balancing of the equities." 56
Although the requirement of bond exists, and may act as a significant
deterrent to an impecunious plaintiff, the amount-when bond is required
-has been set as low as one hundred dollars. 7 The granting of a tem-
porary injunction is largely discretionary, and the Supreme Court has
52 M. at 1264.
53 Bucldein v. Volpe, - F. Supp. -, 2 ERC 1082, 1083 (ND. Calif. 1971).
5UEDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (ED. Ark. 1971).
55Texas Comm. v. United States, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970); Wilderness Society
v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
56 Investment Syndicates v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
5 7 Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
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denied certiorari where the plaintiff has sought pre-judgment review of
a denial of a temporary order."'
D. Defenses to Actions Under NEPA
Because an action under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 contemplates injunctive relief, the courts have applied the equitable
defense of laches to it.59 There is divergent authority on whether sov-
ereign immunity will bar an injunction against the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and the United States Army, 0 but it has been held not to bar an
action against the chief of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Secre-
tary of the Army."' On the other hand, sovereign immunity will bar an
action against a state director of highways, and against contractors work-
ing at his direction. 62 Furthermore, it may be expected that other equi-
table defenses will be applied to these actions in future cases.
E. Quo Vadis?
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is a curious conglom-
erate of desirable objectives coupled with inadequate machinery for the
enforcement and ultimate realization of its goals. It creates no substan-
tive rights to environmental quality. Yet, it establishes complex pro-
cedural machinery to ensure that federal agencies go through the mo-
tions of environmental consideration, as though such a right did exist.
It requires that an elaborate, detailed Environmental Impact Statement
be filed with the Council on Environmental Quality, to expose the pos-
sible environmental threats posed by major federal actions. However,
the Council has no power to compel the filing of an adequate statement,
and will not release its criticisms of those statements which are filed.
While Congress may have acted wisely in refusing to sacrifice agency
productivity on the altar of environmental excellence, its present ap-
58 Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968 (1970) (dissenting
opinion to denial of certiorari).
59 See Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970) (holding no unreasonable delay, hence no bar).
60EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971) (sovereign immunity
not applicable); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(sovereign immunity applicable).
61 EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325, F. Supp. 728, 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
62 Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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proach to the environmental issue tends toward an overly permissive
view of ecological abuse.
The Act seeks to further national policy in favor of environmental
balance, yet the courts have granted sovereign immunity to state officials
directly responsible for implementation of projects which violate its most
basic mandates.
In plain terms, the act must be strengthened to become effective. En-
forcement machinery must be incorporated on the administrative level
so that its policy objectives may be translated into reality. The NEPA
represents a giant step, it is true-but only a step. It is to be hoped that
its weaknesses will be strengthened, and that the courts will interpret it
more liberally. Only then will the laudable objective of a more pleasing
environment for present and future generations of Americans be realized.
1. D. F., 11*
* Editor's note: The Review is grateful to J. Durwood Felton, III for this contribu-
tion. Mr. Felton, a former member of the Editorial Board, received his J.D. from
Richmond in June, 1971.
